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Privacy-Preserving Public Release of Datasets
for Support Vector Machine Classification
Farhad Farokhi, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—We consider the problem of publicly releasing a dataset for support vector machine classification while not infringing on the
privacy of data subjects (i.e., individuals whose private information is stored in the dataset). The dataset is systematically obfuscated
using an additive noise for privacy protection. Motivated by the Crame´r-Rao bound, inverse of the trace of the Fisher information matrix
is used as a measure of the privacy. Conditions are established for ensuring that the classifier extracted from the original dataset and
the obfuscated one are close to each other (capturing the utility). The optimal noise distribution is determined by maximizing a
weighted sum of the measures of privacy and utility. The optimal privacy-preserving noise is proved to achieve local differential privacy.
The results are generalized to a broader class of optimization-based supervised machine learning algorithms. Applicability of the
methodology is demonstrated on multiple datasets.
Index Terms—Database Privacy, Support Vector Machine Classification, Fisher Information, Coding and Information Theory.
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
ADVANCES in communication and information process-ing have opened new possibilities for data mining and
big data analysis to answers important challenges facing
society. Public and private entities have thus scrambled to
capitalize on these possibilities for improving the quality of
offered services in a data-oriented manner. However, these
enhancements come at the expense of the erosion of privacy
within society. Therefore, there is a need for developing
algorithms balancing utility and privacy.
Most often, governments would like to provide entire
datasets to the public (or select private entities) in a de-
identified (anonymized) manner so that academics, analysts,
and researchers can utilize them for gaining valuable in-
sights and developing new technologies. Release of de-
identified data can still infringe on the privacy of people [1].
Therefore, methods, such as suppression and generalization,
have been previously used for private data release by guar-
anteeing k-anonymity. These methods also may not provide
adequate individual privacy guarantees [2].
This paper proposes a novel method for privacy-
preserving release of an entire dataset while maintaining use-
ful properties, such as statistics required for reconstructing a
support vector machine classifier. This is done by balancing
privacy and utility guarantees using an explicit optimization
problem. The dataset is systematically obfuscated using an
additive noise and the inverse of the trace of the Fisher
information matrix is used as a measure of privacy for
the entries of the dataset. By the use of the Crame´r-Rao
bound [3, p. 169], it can be seen that the defined measure
of privacy provides a lower bound on the ability of an
adversary estimating the individual entries of the dataset.
The use of the Fisher information matrix makes the privacy
metric independent of the sophistication of the adversary,
thus making it a universal measure of privacy. Further, the
Crame´r-Rao bound provides a practical/operational inter-
pretation of the measure of privacy to the data owners,
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i.e., how much someone can learn about an individual in
the dataset based on the publicly released obfuscated data.
Conditions are provided for ensuring that the classifier
extracted from the original data and the noisy data are
“close” to each other. This serves as a measure of utility.
To find the optimal noise distribution, a weighted sum
of the measure of privacy and the measure of utility is
maximized. In some cases, it is proved that the classifier
extracted from the noisy privacy-preserving dataset is identical to
the classifier extracted from the original private data. Therefore,
the utility is fully preserved while preserving the privacy.
Finally, we show that the optimal additive noise from the
presented framework also ensures (ǫ, δ)-local differential
privacy. This is an interesting observation because (i) the
new methodology inherits the strong guarantees that come
with the local differential privacy and (ii) we can provide
an operative interpretation for the parameters of (ǫ, δ)-local
differential privacy using the newmeasure of privacy in this
paper and with the aid of the Crame´r-Rao bound.
In summary, this paper makes the following contribu-
tions in privacy-preserving release of datasets:
• Using the Crame´r-Rao bound, an adversary’s estima-
tion error for reconstructing the individual entries of
a private dataset is related to the inverse of the trace
of the Fisher information matrix. This enables the use
of the Fisher information as a measure of privacy.
• The effect of additive privacy-preserving noise on the
utility of machine learning models is captured. The
utility of the machine learning models is negatively
impacted by the variance of the additive noise. This
is first proved for support vector machines and then
generalized to optimization-based machine learning.
• The optimal privacy-preserving noise distribution is
computed by maximizing a weighted sum of the
measures of privacy and utility.
• The optimal privacy-preserving is shown to be Gaus-
sian and proved to satisfy (ǫ, δ)-local differential
privacy. For additive privacy-preserving noises that
can be correlated among the entries of the dataset,
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a special multi-dimensional Gaussian noise can be
realized that does not degrade the utility of linear
support vector machines while providing privacy.
• An operative interpretation for the parameters of
(ǫ, δ)-local differential privacy is provided by prov-
ing that the ability of an adversary estimating the
individual entries of the dataset is bounded by
O(ln2(δ−1)ǫ−2).
• The effect of the optimal privacy-preserving noise is
demonstrated on the Wisconsin Breast Cancer Di-
agnostic dataset and the Adult dataset using linear
support vector machines and the Lending Club using
linear regression. The utility of the machine learning
models trained on the data obfuscated by the optimal
noise is always better than the utility of machine
learning models trained on the data obfuscated by
the Laplace mechanism for providing local differen-
tial privacy with the same privacy guarantee.
1.1 Related Work
Most often k-anonymity and its extensions, such as ℓ-
diversity and m-invariance, have been utilized for releas-
ing datasets in a privacy-preserving manners [4]–[6]. These
methods are however vulnerable to attacks; see, e.g., [2],
[7], [8]. This demonstrate the need for the use of privacy-
preserving noise when releasing datasets publicly.
Differential privacy is an important methodology for
privacy-preserving data release and handling because of
possessing strong guarantees and post-processing proper-
ties [9]. Differential privacy has been successfully utilized
in machine learning problems with applications to support
vector machines [10], [11], logistic regression [12], [13], and
deep learning [14], [15]. These studies, however, concen-
trate on responding to aggregate queries, such as releasing
trained machine learning models in a privacy-preserving
manner or reporting statistics of a dataset without jeopar-
dising privacy of individuals. Another relevant notion of
privacy is local differential privacy in which the data of in-
dividuals in perturbed locally to ensure privacy, perhaps due
to the lack of trust in the aggregator. Although powerful in
preserving privacy, differential privacy and local differential
privacy often lack systematic approaches for selecting their
parameters, also known as the privacy budget, in order
to balance utility and privacy. This has caused concerns
in effectiveness of implementations of differentially-private
mechanisms in practice [16]. In this paper, with the aid of
the Fisher information and the Crame´r-Rao bound, we also
provide a systematic approach for setting the privacy bud-
gets in local differential privacy when using the Gaussian
mechanism.
An alternative to differential privacy is information-
theoretic privacy, dating back to wiretap channels [17] and
their extension [18]. Information-theoretic measures of pri-
vacy use mean square estimation error [19], mutual infor-
mation [20], and the Fisher information [21] for measuring
private information leakage. The use of entropy as a mea-
sure of privacy forces the private dataset to be statistically
distributed with known distributions. For instance, it is
assumed that the density of the private dataset is known [22]
or that the data is Gaussian in [23]. This weakens the results
as the density of the data might not be available in advance
or that data might follow the underlying assumptions.
Therefore, in this paper, we use the Fisher information as
a measure of private information leakage because it does
not impose statistical assumptions on the private dataset. In
fact, when using the Fisher information, the private dataset
is treated as an unknown arbitrary deterministic object with
no assumptions about its origin. The Fisher information has
been previously used for privacy preservation in [21], [24]–
[26]. In those studies, however, the utility was not tailored
to preserving quality of machine learning models as in this
paper. For instance, in this paper, we show that a special
multi-dimensional Gaussian noise can be used for privacy-
preservation that does not degrade the utility of linear
support vector machines. This would not have been possible
following those studies.
Other approaches for privacy-preserving machine learn-
ing have been proposed previously [27]. These approaches
also rely on privacy-preserving release of the machine learn-
ing model rather than the dataset.
In image datasets, partial obfuscation of images to hide
important private features, such as faces or license plates,
have been considered [28], [29]. However, these studies do
not easily generalize to other dataset.
The results of this paper are close, in spirit, to construc-
tion of synthetic datasets in which a dataset is generated
to match statistics of the original dataset perturbed in a
differentially-private manner; see, e.g., [30], [31]. Synthetic
datasets are known to contain implausible entries (e.g.,
smoking infant) due to only considering low order statistics
(e.g., the first and second order statistics). This is because of
the underlying computational complexity associated with
realising synthetic datasets. Furthermore, generation of syn-
thetic datasets requires stochasticity assumptions.
1.2 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The method-
ology is developed in Sections 2. Numerical results are
demonstrated in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 concludes the
paper and provides some directions for future research.
2 METHODOLOGY
We start with presenting the results for the simple case of
linear support vector machines. At the end of this section,
in Subsection 2.4, we show that the results hold for more
general optimization-based machine learning algorithms.
2.1 Soft Margin Support Vector Machine
Consider a set of training data {(xi, yi)}qi=1 ⊆ Rp ×
{−1,+1}. In binary linear support vector machine classi-
fication, it is desired to obtain a separating hyper plane
of the form {x ∈ Rp : f(x) = α⊤x + β = 0}, with its
corresponding classification rule sign(f(x)) to group the
training data into two sets (of y = +1 and y = −1), i.e.,
ensure that sign(f(xi)) = yi for all i. Up to re-scaling of α
and β, this problem can be cast as
argmin
α∈Rp,β∈R,ξ∈Rq
1
2
α⊤α+ θ1⊤ξ, (1a)
s.t. yi(α
⊤xi + β) ≥ 1− ξi, ∀i ∈ Q, (1b)
ξi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ Q. (1c)
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where Q := {1, . . . , q} and θ > 0. Note that yi(α⊤xi+ β) >
1 implies that yi and f(x) = α
⊤xi + β have the same sign,
i.e., the classifier correctly groups the training data (xi, yi).
Since it might not be possible to perfectly classify the data
into two sets, there might be cases in which ξi > 1 for some
i. In those cases, the classifier miss-categorizes some data
points. It is desired to keep the number of such entries
as low as possible by adding the term θ1⊤ξ to the cost
function. The optimization problem in (1) may not admit
a unique solution. To alleviate this issue, an alternative
problem can be posed:
(α∗, β∗, ξ∗) := argmin
α∈Rp,β∈R,ξ∈Rq
1
2
α⊤α+
ρ
2
(β2+ξ⊤ξ)+θ1⊤ξ, (2a)
s.t. yi(α
⊤xi+β)≥1−ξi, ∀i∈Q, (2b)
ξi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ Q, (2c)
where ρ > 0. The uniqueness of the solution of (2) is guaran-
teed by the strict convexity of the cost and the convexity of
the constraint set. Note that, by reducing ρ, the solution of
the optimization problem in (2) can be made to arbitrarily
closely approximate a solution of (1). Therefore, the pro-
posed alteration is without loss of generality; however, it
simplifies the derivation of subsequent results.
Proposition 2.1. Let ℵ denote the set of solutions of (1).
Then, limρց0(α
∗, β∗, ξ∗) ∈ ℵ.
Proof: See Appendix A.
2.2 Independently and Identically Distributed Noise
Solving (2), or as a matter of fact (1), requires access to
the training data, which can infringe on the privacy of
individuals whose data is gathered for machine learning
training. Therefore, the data owners are inclined to provide
a noisy version of the data {(x¯i, yi)}i∈Q ⊆ Rp × {−1,+1}
in which
x¯i = xi + ni, (3)
where ni ∈ Rp is a zero-mean random additive noise with
probability density function γ : Rp → R≥0. Note that ni,
∀i ∈ Q, are assumed to be drawn from the same distri-
bution. Therefore, they are independently and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) random variables. This makes process of
generating the noise computationally friendly for very large
databases (i.e., when q is very large); however, as explained
later, it also restricts the set of applicable noises. In the next
subsection, the noise is generalized by removing the i.i.d.
assumption.
Assumption 2.1. γ is twice continuously differentiable.
Under this assumption, a lower-bound for an adver-
sary’s estimation error of the private database (based on the
noisy data) can be determined. The lower bound is indepen-
dent of the actions of the adversary and is thus immune to
unrealistic assumptions (e.g., that the adversary is rational
in case of game-theoretic approaches to privacy analysis).
In what follows, supp(γ) is defined to be {n | γ(n) > 0}.
Further, for any continuously differentiable function g(x),
the notation ∂g(x)/∂x is reserved to denote a column
vector containing the partial derivatives of the function1.
1. Note that there are other conventions in which the gradient is a
row vector; however, in this paper, the gradient is a column vector.
Further, for any twice continuously differentiable function
g(x), D2g(x) is the Hessian matrix (i.e., a symmetric matrix
containing all the second order partial derivative).
Proposition 2.2. For any unbiased estimate of xi denoted by
xˆi, it holds that
E{‖Π(xi − xˆi)‖22} ≥ Tr(ΠI−1) ≥ 1/Tr(Π−1I), (4)
where Π ∈ Rp×p is a positive definite matrix and I is the
Fisher information matrix defined as
I =
∫
n∈supp(γ)
γ(n)
[
∂ log(γ(n))
∂n
][
∂ log(γ(n))
∂n
]⊤
dn. (5)
Proof: The first inequality in (4) follows from
the Crame´r-Rao bound [3, p. 169]. The rest follows
from the fact that Tr(ΠI−1) = Tr(Π1/2I−1Π1/2) ≥
1/Tr(Π−1/2IΠ−1/2) = 1/Tr(Π−1I) with the inequality
stemming from Item (11) in [32, p. 44].
Therefore, by minimizing Tr(Π−1I), the privacy of the
participants can be guaranteed. This is because, irrespective
of the adversaries behaviour (computational resources, in-
telligence, etc.), it cannot estimate the original entries of the
database with an estimation error smaller than 1/Tr(Π−1I).
Note that the positive definite scaling matrix Π is used here
because not all entries of xi have the same scaling (e.g., some
might be fractional numbers between zero and one while
others are large integers).
The addition of the noise potentially changes the clas-
sifier. Therefore, a measure of quality must be established
(as otherwise the most private decision is to use an additive
noise with co-variance approaching infinity). The optimal
linear support vector machine can be extracted from
(α¯∗, β¯∗, ξ¯∗) := argmin
α∈Rp,β∈R,ξ∈Rq
1
2
α⊤α+
ρ
2
(β2+ξ⊤ξ)+θ1⊤ξ, (6a)
s.t. yi(α
⊤x¯i+β)≥1−ξi, ∀i∈Q, (6b)
ξi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ Q. (6c)
Note that the difference between (2) and (6) is access to the
noisy or original data. The solution of (6) is in fact a random
variable. The quality of the classifier extracted from the
noisy data can be guaranteed by ensuring that the following
measure of quality is large:
D := P

∥∥∥∥∥∥
α¯∗ − α∗β¯∗ − β∗
ξ¯∗ − ξ∗

∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ ε
 . (7)
The following result relates D to the second moment of the
distribution of the additive noise.
Proposition 2.3. There exist c ≥ 1 and ε0 > 0 such that D ≥
1− (qc2/ε2)Tr(Vnn), ∀ε ∈ (0, ε0) with Vnn := E{nn⊤}.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark 2.1. The proof of Proposition 2.3, stemming from
the application of [33, Theorem 4.4], requires that the
cost function of the classification optimization problem
is positive definite. This is clearly the case for all choices
of ρ > 0. We can still select ρ to be very small to reduce
its impact on the classifier. This follows from Proposition
2.1 proving that the classifier with ρ > 0 is close to the
classifier with ρ = 0 if ρ is small enough. Therefore,
restricting the classification problem to ρ > 0 will not
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Fig. 1. The gray region illustrates the set of δ and ǫ that meet the
condition of Theorem 2.5 with
√
λ‖Π1/2‖∞,2 = 0.1.
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Fig. 2. The lower bound on E{‖Π(xi − xˆi)‖22} for the case where
Tr(Π1/2)‖Π1/4‖2
∞,2 = 1.
significantly or adversely influence the classifier if ρ is
small. Regarding privacy, we should note that the addi-
tion of Gaussian noise will always protect the privacy
of the data; see Theorem 2.5 for guarantees in the sense
of differential privacy. However, by selecting ρ = 0, we
cannot analyze the utility of privacy-preserving dataset.
Therefore, we recommend selecting an infinitesimally
small ρ to also provide utility guarantees.
Proposition 2.3 shows that, if the co-variance of the
additive noise is kept small,D remains large. This motivates
the following formulation for finding the optimal privacy-
preserving noise:
P(λ) : min
γ
Tr(Π−1I) + λTr(Vnn). (8)
We can also cast the problem of finding the optimal privacy-
preserving noise as maxγ [1/Tr(Π
−1I) − λ¯Tr(Vnn)]. How-
ever, these two problems are equivalent in the sense that,
for any λ¯ > 0, there exists λ > 0 such that they admit
the same solution. Now, one of the main results of the
paper regarding the optimal privacy-preserving policy can
be presented.
Theorem 2.4. The solution of P(λ) is given by
γ∗(n)=
1√
det(2πΠ−1/2/
√
λ)
exp
(
−
√
λ
2
n⊤Π1/2n
)
. (9)
Proof: See Appendix C.
The optimal additive noise in Theorem 2.4, which is a
Gaussian noise, meets the condition of (ǫ, δ)-local differen-
tial privacy, presented below.
Definition 2.1. The reporting policy in (3) is (ǫ, δ)-locally
differential private if P{xi+ni ∈ X} ≤ exp(ǫ)P{x′i+ni ∈
X} + δ, where X ⊆ Rp is a Borel-measurable set and
xi, x
′
i are possible entries in the dataset.
Theorem 2.5. The optimal additive noise in Theorem 2.4
is (ǫ, δ)-locally differential private for all ǫ, δ satisfying
λ1/4‖Π1/4‖∞,2(1 +
√
2 ln(1/δ)) ≤ ǫ, where ‖A‖∞,2 =
maxx 6=0 ‖Ax‖2/‖x‖∞ is the induced norm of A.
Proof: The proof follows from combining the result
of Theorem 2.4 and the differential privacy property of
Gaussian additive noises in [34].
Theorem 2.5 proves that the optimal noise in Theo-
rem 2.4 is (ǫ, δ)-locally differential private. This is an impor-
tant result as it shows that the new measure of privacy in-
herits the strong guarantees of differential privacy. The gray
region in Fig. 1 illustrates the set of δ and ǫ that meet the con-
dition of Theorem 2.5 with λ1/4‖Π1/4‖∞,2 = 0.1. For (ǫ, δ)-
locally differential private Gaussian mechanism, with the
aid of Proposition 2.8, we can see that E{‖Π(xi − xˆi)‖22} ≥
Tr(Π1/2)‖Π1/4‖2∞,2(1+
√
2 ln(1/δ))2/ǫ2 = O(ln2(δ−1)ǫ−2).
This inequality provides an operative iteration to the pa-
rameters of the differential privacy, i.e., we can bound
on the error of estimating entries of the private database
E{‖Π(xi − xˆi))‖22} for a specific selections of (ǫ, δ). Fig. 2
illustrates the lower bound on E{‖Π(xi − xˆi)‖22} for the
case where Tr(Π1/2)‖Π1/4‖2∞,2 = 1. As expected, the ad-
versary’s estimation error grows by decreasing ǫ and δ.
In general, it might be desired to use noises whose
support set is constrained to be a subset of N ⊆ Rp. This
is because entries of database must be within some range to
make sense (e.g., age or height cannot be negative). Note
that, in this case, one cannot necessarily ensure that the
additive noise has a zero mean (due to the arbitrary nature
of the set N ). In this case, the problem can be cast as
P(λ) : min
γ
Tr(Π−1I) + λTr(Vnn), (10a)
s.t. supp(γ) ⊆ N . (10b)
Theorem 2.6. The solution of P(λ) is γ∗(n) =√
det(Π)u(n)2, where
∇2u(n) + (µ− (λ/4)n⊤Π−1n)u(n) = 0, (11a)
u(n) = 0, ∀n ∈ ∂N , u(n) > 0, ∀n ∈ int(N ), (11b)∫
n∈N
u(n)2dn = 1, (11c)
for some µ > 0 with N := {Π1/2n, ∀n ∈ N}.
Proof: The proof follows from the same line of rea-
soning as in the proof of Theorem 2.4 with the change of
variable γ(n) =
√
det(Π)u(Π1/2n)2.
Note that the partial differential equation (11a) is a
stationary (time-independent) Schro¨dinger equation. There-
fore, it admits a unique solution for each µ [35]. Here, µ is
the dual variable corresponding to the equality constraint
in (11c) and can be computed using the dual ascent.
Corollary 2.7. Let Π=diag(ϑ1, . . . , ϑp),N =
∏
i[ni, ni]. The
solution of P(λ) is γ∗(n) =
√∏
i ϑi(
∏
i ui(ni))
2, where,
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ p,
d2ui(ni)/dn
2
i + (µi − (λ/(4ϑi))n2i )ui(n) = 0, (12a)
ui(ni)=0, ni∈{ni, ni}, u(n) > 0, ∀ni ∈ (ni, ni), (12b)∫ ni
ni
ui(ni)
2dn = 1, (12c)
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for some µi > 0.
Proof: The proof follows from the method of separa-
tion of variables [35].
The differential equations in Corollary 2.7 are known
as the Airy differential equations and their solution can
be characterized using the Airy functions [36]. So far, the
additive noise are somewhat conservative as they are i.i.d.
This assumption is removed in the next subsection.
2.3 Correlated Noise
In this section, it is assumed that the additive noise for
various data points is correlated. Therefore, [x¯⊤1 · · · x¯⊤q ]⊤ =
[x⊤1 · · · x⊤q ]⊤ + w, where w ∈ Rqp is a zero-mean random
additive noise with probability density function γ˜ : Rqp →
R≥0. Similarly, the following standing assumption holds.
Assumption 2.2. γ˜(w) is twice continuously differentiable.
Again, the Crame´r-Rao bound can be used to establish a
lower bound on the ability of the adversary for inferring the
private database. In this paper,⊗ and ◦, respectively, denote
the Kronecker and the Hadamard products.
Proposition 2.8. For any unbiased estimate of xi denoted by
xˆi, it holds that
min
1≤i≤q
E{‖Π(xi − xˆi)‖22}≥ min
1≤i≤q
Tr(Π[(e⊤i ⊗Ip)I˜(ei⊗Ip)]−1)
≥ 1/Tr((Iq ⊗Π−1)−1I˜), (13)
where I˜ is the Fisher information matrix defined as
I˜ =
∫
w∈Rqp
γ˜(w)
[
∂ log(γ˜(w))
∂w
][
∂ log(γ˜(w))
∂w
]⊤
dw. (14)
Proof: See Appendix D.
The Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions for (2) are
α∗ =
q∑
i=1
(ω∗)iyixi, β
∗ =
q∑
i=1
(ω∗)iyi/ρ, (15a)
(ξ∗)i = max(((ω
∗)i + (ς
∗)i − 1)/ρ, 0), ∀i ∈ Q, (15b)
0 = (ω∗)i(yi(α
∗⊤xi + β
∗)− 1 + (ξ∗)i),∀i ∈ Q, (15c)
0 = (ξ∗)i(ς
∗)i, ∀i ∈ Q, (15d)
where ω∗, ς∗ ∈ Rq≥0 are Lagrange multipliers. The set of
equations in (15) have at least one solution due to the strict
convexity of the cost and the convexity of the constraint set.
Proposition 2.9. P
{
α¯∗=α∗, β¯∗=β∗, ξ¯∗=ξ∗
}
= P{Ωw=0}
with Ω := [((λ∗ ◦ y)⊤ ⊗ Ip)⊤ (Iq ⊗ α∗⊤)⊤]⊤.
Proof: See Appendix E.
This motivates the following problem formulation to
find most privacy-preserving noise for which the classifiers
extracted from the original data and the noisy data are
identical:
P˜ : min
γ˜
Tr((Iq ⊗Π−1)I˜), (16a)
s.t. Vww ≤ mI, (16b)
P {Ωw = 0} = 1, (16c)
where Vww is the co-variance of the additive noise, m > 0,
and I is the identity matrix. The constraint Vww ≤ mI is
added to ensure that a noise with finite moment (thus realiz-
able) is obtained. This is without any practical consequences
asm can be selected arbitrarily large.
Theorem 2.10. Let Ψ be a matrix whose columns form an
orthonormal basis for the null space of Ω. The solu-
tion of P˜ is γ˜(w) = 1w∈im(Ψ)γˆ(Ψ
†w), where γˆ(w¯) =
((2πm)dim(im(Ψ)))−1/2 exp(−w¯⊤w¯/(2m)).
Proof: See Appendix F.
Theorem 2.10 provides the optimal noise for corrupting
the dataset without any adverse effect on the utility of the
linear support vector machine (i.e., no utility degradation).
2.4 Optimization-Based Machine Learning
Here, we generalize the problem formulation of the pre-
vious subsections to more general optimization-based ma-
chine learning algorithms. Consider a set of training data
{(xi, yi)}qi=1 ⊆ Rpx × Rpy . A general optimization-based
machine learning problem can be cast as
argmin
ϕ∈Rpϕ
ℓ(ϕ; {(xi, yi)}qi=1), (17)
where ℓ is a fitness function. For instance, in nonlinear
soft margin support vector machine ℓ(ϕ; {(xi, yi)}qi=1) :=
0.5ϕ⊤diag(I, 0)ϕ + θ
∑q
i=1max
(
1− yi
[
κ(xi)
⊤ yi
]
ϕ, 0
)
,
where κ(xi) denotes the transformed data points using
nonlinear mapping κ(·). Another example is the artificial
neural networks with ℓ(ϕ; {(xi, yi)}qi=1) := 1q
∑q
i=1 ‖yi −
ANN(xi, ϕ)‖22, where ANN(x, ϕ) denotes the output of the
artificial neural network.
Proposition 2.11. Assume ℓ is twice continuously differ-
entiable. There exist c ≥ 1 and ε0 > 0 such that D ≥
1−(q2c2/ε2)Tr(Vnn), ∀ε ∈ (0, ε0) with Vnn :=E{nn⊤}.
Proof: See Appendix G.
The result of Proposition 2.11 shows that the problem
formulation (8) is still relevant for optimization-based ma-
chine learning. Therefore, Theorem 2.4 still provides the
optimal additive noise when releasing datasets for more
general machine learning algorithms.
Remark 2.2 (Differentiability of Fitness Function). Propo-
sition 2.11 requires the fitness function to be twice dif-
ferentiable. This is not the case generally. For instance,
in deep learning, a popular non-differentiable activa-
tion function is rectified linear unit (ReLU). However,
other activation functions, such as Sigmoid, softplus [37],
GELU [38], SoftExponential [39], and SQNL [40], can be
used to ensure twice-differentiability of fitness function.
Again, note that the addition of a Gaussian noise will
always protect the privacy of the data; see Theorem 2.5.
However, selecting a non-twice-differentiable loss func-
tion restricts our ability in analyzing the utility.
3 NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
3.1 Illustrative Example
First, consider a simple example for the sake of the il-
lustration of the results. A random dataset is generated
with 50 entries drawn from a two-dimensional zero-mean
Gaussian distribution with unit co-variance (corresponding
to y = +1) and another 50 entries drawn from a two-
dimensional Gaussian distribution with unit co-variance
and mean [0 5]⊤ (corresponding to y = −1). This dataset
can be easily classified (visually), which is beneficial for
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Fig. 3. The blue dots illustrate the original data points (xi)i∈Q and the blue line is the classifier extracted from (2) using the original data. The red,
yellow, and purple dots show the noisy data (x¯i)i∈Q with the optimal noise in Theorem 2.4 for λ = 10
−4 , λ = 10−2, and λ = 100, respectively.
The solid lines illustrate the classifiers extracted from (6) using the noisy data of the corresponding color.
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Fig. 4. The blue dots illustrate the original data (xi)i∈Q and the blue line
is the classifier extracted from (2) using the original data. The red dots
illustrate the noisy data (x¯i)i∈Q with the optimal noise in Theorem 2.10.
The classifier extracted from (6) using the noisy data remains the same.
the illustration of the effect of the noise. In what follows
ρ = 10−2 so that the solutions of (1) and (2) are sufficiently
close. Further, θ = 1 and Π = I .
First, the case with i.i.d. noise is considered. This is
illustrated in Fig. 3. The blue dots show the original data
(xi)i∈Q and the blue line is the classifier extracted from (2)
using the original data. The red, yellow, and purple dots
show the noisy data (x¯i)i∈Q with the optimal noise in
Theorem 2.4 for λ = 10−4, λ = 10−2, and λ = 100,
respectively. The solid lines illustrate the classifiers extracted
from (6) using the noisy data of the corresponding color.
As expected, the classifiers constructed using the noisy data
approaches the classifier extracted from the original data
as λ increases. Note that E{‖xi − xˆi‖22} is lower bounded
by 200, 20, and 2 for λ = 10−4, λ = 10−2, and λ = 100,
respectively.
Now, the case with correlated additive noise is con-
sidered. Fig. 4 shows the results in this case. The blue
dots illustrate the original data (xi)i∈Q and the blue line
is the classifier extracted from (2) using the original data.
The red dots illustrate the noisy data (x¯i)i∈Q with the
optimal noise in Theorem 2.10 for m = 100. Note that
using this noise, the extracted classifier from (6) is the same
as the classifier extracted from the original data. In this
case, E{‖xi − xˆi‖} ≥ 80.5. This error can be worsened by
increasingm. The specific structure of the noise spreads the
data along the classifier (and not towards it).
3.2 Experimental Results
Here, the applicability of the presented methodology on
practical datasets is demonstrated with two machine learn-
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Fig. 5. (top) The blue line illustrates the classification success rate of
the classifier generated from the original data. The red curve depicts the
classification success rate using the classifier extracted from (6) using
the noisy data corrupted with the optimal noise in Theorem 2.4 versus
λ. The yellow curve shows the classification success rate based on the
dataset obfuscated using Laplace noise to achieve local differential pri-
vacy (with the same privacy guarantee). (bottom) The privacy guarantee
mini E{‖xi − xˆi‖22} versus λ.
ing algorithms. Particularly, we use the Breast Cancer Wis-
consin (Diagnostic) dataset and the Adult dataset with lin-
ear support vector machines and the Lending Club dataset
with linear regression.
3.2.1 Medical Dataset
The Breast Cancer Wisconsin (Diagnostic) Data Set is openly
available in [41] containing features computed from a
digitized image of a fine needle aspirate of breast mass.
The features include parameters, such as radius, texture,
smoothness, and symmetry, of cell nucleus. For this dataset,
we are interested in training a support vector machine for
cancer diagnosis. We systematically corrupt the entries of
the dataset to avoid the unintentional private data leakages.
First, the case of i.i.d. additive noise is demonstrated. The
red curve in Fig. 5 (top) shows E{∑qi=1 1yi(α¯∗⊤xi+β¯∗)>0}/n,
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Adult dataset
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Fig. 6. The blue line illustrates the classification success rate of the
classifier generated from the original data. The red curve depicts the
classification success rate using the classifier extracted from (6) using
the noisy data corrupted with the optimal noise in Theorem 2.4 versus
λ. The yellow curve shows the classification success rate based on
the dataset obfuscated using Laplace noise to achieve local differential
privacy (with the same privacy guarantee).
empirically computed by averaging 100 simulations, versus
λ. In this case, the classifier is extracted from the noisy
data with the optimal noise in Theorem 2.4. Note that
E{∑qi=1 1yi(α¯∗⊤xi+β¯∗)>0}/n is the classification success rate
of the original data using the classifier generated from the
noisy data. The blue line illustrates the success rate of the
classifier extracted from the original data. As λ increases,
the success rate of the classifier from the noisy data ap-
proaches the classification rate of the classifier based on the
original data. The yellow curve shows the classification rate
for the case where the dataset is corrupted using Laplace
noise to achieve local differential privacy. The level of the
differential privacy is set so that the the privacy guarantee
mini E{‖xi − xˆi‖} remains the same for both noises. This
is to ensure that methods are compared in a fair manner.
When using the Laplace mechanism, the success rate of the
classifier is always below the optimal noise in Theorem 2.4.
The red curve in Fig. 5 (bottom) illustrates the level of
privacy mini E{‖xi − xˆi(x¯)‖} versus λ. Fig. 5 captures the
trade-off between privacy and utility.
The correlated additive noise can also be utilized in this
example. Upon using the noisy data (x¯i)i∈Q with the opti-
mal noise in Theorem 2.10, mini∈Q E{‖xi − xˆi‖} ≥ 28.4m.
Therefore, for m = 100, mini∈Q E{‖xi − xˆi‖} ≥ 2840. Note
that, in this case, the classifier remains exactly the same even
with such a high privacy guarantee.
3.2.2 Adult Dataset
This dataset contains nearly 49,000 records from the 1994
Census database [41]. The records contain features, such as
age, education, and work. The aim is to train a classifier that
identifies individuals earning more than $50,000. Here, we
obfuscate the dataset in order to eliminate private informa-
tion leakages about the individuals in the dataset.
We illustrate the effect of the optimal privacy-preserving
noise in Theorem 2.4 in Fig. 6. The red curve in Fig. 5 shows
E{∑qi=1 1yi(α¯∗⊤xi+β¯∗)>0}/n, empirically computed by av-
eraging 100 simulations, versus λ. The blue line illustrates
the success rate of the classifier extracted from the original
data. The success rate of the classifier from the noisy data
approaches the classification rate of the classifier based on
the original data as λ increases. The yellow curve shows the
Lending Club dataset
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Fig. 7. The blue line illustrates the fitness of regression model generated
from the original data. The red curve depict the fitness of the regression
model extracted from (17) using the noisy data corrupted with the optimal
noise in Theorem 2.4 versus λ. The yellow curve shows the fitness of
regression model based on the dataset obfuscated using Laplace noise
to achieve local differential privacy (with the same privacy guarantee).
classification success rate for the case where the dataset is
corrupted using Laplace noise to achieve local differential
privacy. Again, the level of the differential privacy is set so
that the the privacy guarantee, mini E{‖xi − xˆi‖}, remains
the same for both noises. Evidently, the optimal privacy-
preserving noise in Theorem 2.4 outperforms the Laplace
noise in terms of the utility of the trained support vector
machine model.
3.2.3 Finance Dataset
This dataset contains information about approximately
890,000 loans made on the Lending Club, which is a peer-
to-peer lending platform [42]. The dataset contains infor-
mation about the loans, such as total amount, information
about the borrower, such as age and credit rating, and
the interest rates of the loans. We encode categorical data,
such as state of residence and loan grade, with integer
numbers. We also remove unique identifier attributes, such
as member id, and unrelated attributes, such as the URL
for the listing data. We are interested in training a linear
regressionϕ⊤xi to estimate the loan interest rate yi. Training
the regression model can be cast as (17) with loss function
ℓ(ϕ; {(xi, yi)}qi=1) := σϕ⊤ϕ+
∑q
i=1(yi−ϕ⊤xi)2/q for σ > 0.
In what follows, we set σ = 10−5.
Fig. 7 shows the expected loss E{ℓ(ϕ∗; {(xi, yi)}qi=1)},
empirically computed by averaging 100 simulations, as a
function of λ. The red curve captures the fitness of the
regression model generated from the noisy data with the
optimal noise in Theorem 2.4. The blue line illustrates the
fitness of the regression model extracted from the original
data without privacy preserving noise. As λ, or the empha-
sis on utility, increases the fitness of the regression model
from the noisy data approaches the fitness of the regression
model computed based on the original data. The yellow
curve shows the fitness rate for the case where the dataset
is corrupted using Laplace noise to achieve local differential
privacy. The fitness of the regression model with the optimal
noise in Theorem 2.4 is always better than the one with
Laplace noise.
4 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
A private dataset was corrupted by an additive noise for
privacy protection in such a way that the classifier extracted
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from it remains close to the classifier computed based on the
original dataset. The applicability of the methodology was
demonstrated on practical datasets in medicine, demogra-
phy, and finance. Future work can focus on implementation
of constrained additive noises for practical datasets.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.1
Define the set valued mapping Sopt : R⇒ R
p×R×Rq such
that
Sopt(p) :=
{
(α′, β′, ξ′) ∈ Sfeas
∣∣∣∣∀(α, β, ξ) ∈ Sfeas :
1
2
α′⊤α′ +
ρ
2
(β′2 + ξ′⊤ξ′) + θ1⊤ξ′
≤ 1
2
α⊤α+
ρ
2
(β2 + ξ⊤ξ) + θ1⊤ξ
}
,
where
Sfeas :=
{
(α, β, ξ) ∈ Rp × R× Rq
∣∣∣∣ yi(α⊤xi + β) ≥ 1− ξi,
∀i ∈ Q ∧ ξi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ Q
}
.
By definition, Sopt(p) is the set of the solutions of (2) for
all p (including p = 0). Therefore, for all p > 0, Sopt(p) =
{(α∗, β∗, ξ∗)} and Sopt(0) = ℵ. From Theorem 3B.5 in [43],
it can be deduced that lim supp→0 Sopt(p) ⊆ Sopt(0) = ℵ.
The rest follows from the fact that limρց0(α
∗, β∗, ξ∗) =
limρց0 Sopt(p) ⊆ lim supρ→0 Sopt(p) ⊆ ℵ where the first
equality follows from the fact that Sopt(p) is a singleton for
all p > 0.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.3
First, it is established that there exist c ≥ 1 and ǫ0 > 0 such
that∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
y1(x1 − x¯1)
⊤
...
yq(xq − x¯q)⊤

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ ǫ < ǫ0 =⇒
∥∥∥∥∥∥
α¯∗ − α∗β¯∗ − β∗
ξ¯∗ − ξ∗

∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ cǫ.
The proof of this claim follows from [33, Theorem 4.4] and
reorganizing the inequality constraints in (2) and (6) to be of
the form of
−
y1x
⊤
1 y1
...
...
yqx
⊤
q yq
[αβ
]
≤ −11, −
y1x¯
⊤
1 y1
...
...
yqx¯
⊤
n yq
 [αβ
]
≤ −11.
Note that∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
y1(x1 − x¯1)
⊤
...
yn(xq − x¯q)⊤

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
= max
‖p‖2=1
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
y1(x1 − x¯1)
⊤
...
yn(xq − x¯q)⊤
 p
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
= max
‖p‖2=1
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
y1n
⊤
1
...
yqn
⊤
q
 p
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤
√√√√max
‖p‖=1
q∑
i=1
(yin⊤i p)
2
=
√√√√max
‖p‖=1
q∑
i=1
(n⊤i p)
2
≤
√√√√max
‖p‖=1
q∑
i=1
‖ni‖22‖p‖22=
√√√√ q∑
i=1
‖ni‖22.
This implies that
P

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
y1(x1 − x¯1)
⊤
...
yq(xq − x¯q)⊤

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ ǫ
 ≥ P

√√√√ q∑
i=1
‖ni‖22 ≤ ǫ

= P
{
q∑
i=1
‖ni‖22 ≤ ǫ2
}
Therefore, it can be proved that
P

∥∥∥∥∥∥
α¯∗ − α∗β¯∗ − β∗
ξ¯∗ − ξ∗

∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ cǫ
 ≥P

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
y1(x1 − x¯1)
⊤
...
yq(xq − x¯q)⊤

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ ǫ

≥P
{
q∑
i=1
‖ni‖22 ≤ ǫ2
}
=1− P
{
q∑
i=1
‖ni‖22 ≥ ǫ2
}
≥1− 1
ǫ2
E
{
q∑
i=1
‖ni‖22
}
,
where the last inequality follows from the Markov’s in-
equality [44, Theorem 8.3]. Noting that E{∑qi=1 ‖ni‖22} =
qTr(
∫
n nn
⊤γ(n)dn) while setting ε = cǫ and ε0 = cǫ0
completes the proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2.4
Note that
L :=Tr(Π−1I) +
∫
n
λn⊤nγ(n)dn+ µ
(
− 1 +
∫
n
γ(n)dn
)
=
∫
n
(
1
γ(n)
[
∂γ(n)
∂n
]⊤
Π−1
[
∂γ(n)
∂n
]
+ (λn⊤n+ µ)γ(n)
)
dn− µ.
Noting that the cost function and the constraints are convex,
the stationary condition of L (that the variational derivative
is equal to zero) is sufficient for optimality. Further, if
multiple density functions satisfy the sufficiency conditions,
they all exhibit the same cost. Using Theorem 5.3 in [45,
p. 440], it can be seen that the extrema must satisfy
λn⊤n+ µ+
1
γ(n)2
[
∂γ(n)
∂n
]⊤
Π−1
[
∂γ(n)
∂n
]
− 2 1
γ(n)
Tr(Π−1D2γ(n)) = 0.
With the change of variable γ(n) = u(n)2, the condition can
be transformed into
λn⊤n+ µ− 4 1
u(n)
Tr(Π−1D2u(n)) = 0.
It can be seen that the u(n) = c0 exp(−n⊤Xn/2) with
X = Π1/2λ1/2/2 and c0 = (1/ det(πX
−1))1/4 satisfies this
equation with µ = −4Tr(X).
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.8
Define x = [x⊤1 . . . x
⊤
q ]
⊤ and x¯ = [x¯⊤1 . . . x¯
⊤
q ]
⊤. Note that
the conditional probability density function of x¯ = x + w
given x is equal to γ˜(x¯−x). Using the Crame´r-Rao bound [3,
p. 169], it can be deduced that
E{‖Π(xi − xˆi(x¯))‖22}
≥ Tr
(
Π
[ ∫
x¯
γ˜(x¯− x)
[
∂ log(γ˜(x¯ − x))
∂xi
]
×
[
∂ log(γ˜(x¯− x))
∂xi
]⊤
dx¯
]−1)
.
Therefore,
Tr
(
Π
[ ∫
x¯
γ˜(x¯− x)
[
∂ log(γ˜(x¯− x))
∂xi
]
×
[
∂ log(γ˜(x¯− x))
∂xi
]⊤
dx¯
]−1)
= Tr(Π[(e⊤i ⊗ Ip)I˜(ei ⊗ Ip)]−1)
because
∂ log(γ˜(x¯ − x))
∂xi
= (e⊤i ⊗ Ip)
∂ log(γ˜(w))
∂w
∣∣∣∣
w=x¯−x
.
Now, by Item (11) in [32, p. 44], it can be seen that
Tr(Π[(e⊤i ⊗ Ip)I˜(ei ⊗ Ip)]−1)
≥ 1/Tr(Π−1(e⊤i ⊗ Ip)I˜(ei ⊗ Ip))
= 1/Tr((e⊤i ⊗ Ip)(Iq ⊗Π−1)I˜(ei ⊗ Ip))
= 1/Tr(((eie
⊤
i )⊗ Ip)(Iq ⊗Π−1)I˜).
Thus,
max
1≤i≤q
1/E{‖xi − xˆi(x¯)‖22}
≤ max
1≤i≤q
Tr(((eie
⊤
i )⊗ Ip)(Iq ⊗Π−1)I˜)
≤
q∑
i=1
Tr(((eie
⊤
i )⊗ Ip)(Iq ⊗Π−1)I˜)
= Tr((Iq ⊗Π−1)I˜).
The rest follows from the fact that min1≤i≤q E{‖xi −
xˆi(x¯)‖22} = 1/(max1≤i≤q 1/E{‖xi − xˆi(x¯)‖22}).
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.9
Note that x¯ = x + w with x¯ = [x¯⊤1 . . . x¯
⊤
q ]
⊤ and
x = [x⊤1 . . . x
⊤
q ]
⊤, the KKT conditions for (2)–depicted
in (15)–and the KKT conditions for (6) become identical
to each other if and only if
∑q
i=1(ω
∗)iyi(e
⊤
i ⊗ Ip)w = 0
and α∗⊤(e⊤i ⊗ Ip)w = 0. The rest follows from algebraic
manipulation of the equations.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 2.10
If w = Ψw¯ with probability one for some random variable
w¯, it can be seen that Ωw = ΩΨw¯ = 0. Note that γ˜(w) = 0
for all w ∈ im(Ψ)⊥ and γ˜(w) = γˆ(Ψ†w) for all w ∈ im(Ψ),
where γˆ is the probability density function of w¯. Therefore,
I˜ =
∫
w∈Rqp
γ˜(w)
[
∂ log(γ˜(w))
∂w
][
∂ log(γ˜(w))
∂w
]⊤
dw
=
∫
w∈im(Ψ)
γˆ(Ψ†w)
[
∂ log(γˆ(Ψ†w))
∂w
][
∂ log(γˆ(Ψ†w))
∂w
]⊤
dw
=
∫
w¯
γˆ(w¯)Ψ†⊤
[
∂ log(γˆ(w¯))
∂w¯
][
∂ log(γˆ(w¯))
∂w¯
]⊤
Ψ†dw¯.
Further, note that Ψ†Ψ†⊤ = Ψ†(Ψ⊤)† = (Ψ⊤Ψ)† = I,
where the last equality follows from the definition of Ψ.
Therefore, the optimization problem in (16) can be translated
into
min
γˆ
Tr
(
Ψ†(Iq ⊗Π−1)Ψ†⊤
×
∫
w¯
γˆ(w¯)
[
∂ log(γˆ(w¯))
∂w¯
][
∂ log(γˆ(w¯))
∂w¯
]⊤
dw¯
)
,
(18a)
s.t. Vw¯w¯ ≤ mI. (18b)
Following the same line of reasoning as in the proof of
Theorem 2.4, it can be shown that the solution of (18) is
a Gaussian noise with zero mean and co-variance Vw¯w¯ .
Therefore, this problem can be further simplified into
min
Vw¯w¯≥0
Tr
(
Ψ†(Iq ⊗Π−1)Ψ†⊤V −1w¯w¯
)
, (19a)
s.t. Vw¯w¯ ≤ mI. (19b)
Because of the inequality constraint in the above optimiza-
tion problem, V −1w¯w¯ ≥ (1/m)I , and, thus, it can be proved
that
Tr
(
Ψ†(Iq ⊗Π−1)Ψ†⊤V −1w¯w¯
)
= Tr
(
(Iq ⊗Π−1)1/2Ψ†⊤V −1w¯w¯Ψ†(Iq ⊗Π−1)1/2
)
≥ (1/m)Tr
(
(Iq ⊗Π−1)1/2Ψ†⊤Ψ†(Iq ⊗Π−1)1/2
)
= (1/m)Tr
(
Ψ†(Iq ⊗Π−1)Ψ†⊤
)
.
The lower bound on the cost function can be clearly
achieved by selecting Vw¯w¯ = mI .
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.11
The optimality condition is∇φℓ(ϕ; {(xi, yi)}qi=1) = 0. Small
variations of the dataset shows that
D
2
ϕℓ(ϕ; {(xi, yi)}qi=1)∇xjϕ+∇xj∇φℓ(ϕ; {(xi, yi)}qi=1) = 0.
Therefore, if D2ϕℓ(ϕ; {(xi, yi)}qi=1) is invertible, it can be
shown that
∇xjϕ =−[D2ϕℓ(ϕ; {(xi, yi)}qi=1)]−1∇xj∇φℓ(ϕ; {(xi, yi)}qi=1).
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The Taylor’s Theorem shows that
‖ϕ¯− ϕ‖2 ≤
q∑
j=1
[
‖[D2ϕϕℓ(ϕ′; {(xi, yi)}qi=1)]−1
×D2xiϕℓ(ϕ′; {(xi, yi)}qi=1)‖2‖xi − x¯i‖2
]
,
for some ϕ′ = sϕ+ (1− s)ϕ¯ and s ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, there
exist c ≥ 1 and ǫ0 > 0 (due to continuity of the second order
derivatives) such that if
∑q
i=1 ‖xi − x¯i‖2 ≤ ǫ < ǫ0, then
‖ϕ¯ − ϕ‖2 ≤ cǫ. The Markov’s inequality [44, Theorem 8.3]
implies that
P
{
q∑
i=1
‖xi − x¯i‖2 ≤ ǫ/c
}
= P
{
q∑
i=1
‖ni‖2 ≤ ǫ/c
}
= P
{( q∑
i=1
‖ni‖2
)2
≤ ǫ2/c
}
≥ 1− c
2
ǫ2
E
{( q∑
i=1
‖ni‖2
)2}
.
Furthermore,
E
{( q∑
i=1
‖ni‖2
)2}
=E

q∑
i=1
n⊤i ni+
q∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
√
n⊤i nin
⊤
j nj

≤ qTr(Vnn)+
q∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
√
E
{
n⊤i nin
⊤
j nj
}
= qTr(Vnn) +
q∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
√
Tr(Vnn)2
= q2Tr(Vnn).
where the inequality follows from the Jensen’s inequality
(and the concavity of the square root function).
